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RESTITUTION: CONCEPT AND TERMS
Iniroduction and Historical Background
It is well established that much of the American legal system and
many of its problems stem directly from the English common law.1
This is especially true of the field of law which we now call "Resti-
tution, ' 2 and it seems appropriate to preface this discussion of cur-
rent problems in classification and terminology with a brief state-
ment of the history of restitution, although it is readily available in
copious detail from many sources.3
The roots of restitution can be traced to some of the earliest
common law proceedings in debt 4 and account 5 and, due to procedural
difficulties in these actions, to some of the first bills in chancery.6
Because of the popularity of seeking relief in chancery, the jealous
common law courts developed the action of assumpsit. 7 The history
of this action is long and confusing. But in brief, assumpsit was
originally a tort action for negligent performance of an undertaking.8
One branch of the action, called indebitatus assumpsit, then be-
came concurrent with debt for a simple contract,9 later became avail-
able for the implied in fact contract,10 and finally picked up the
1 Norrington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188, 206 (1885); 1 J. KENT, ComnvmN-
TAmEs *473; R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 1-11 (1921); W.
'WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW § 45 (2d ed. 1932).
2 See Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARv. L. REV. 1, 53
(1888).
3 J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913); J. DAwsoN, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT (1951); R. Gor & G. JONES, RESTITUTION (1966); R. JACKSON,
THE HisToRY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN ENGLISH LAW (1936); W. KEENER, QUASI-
CONTRACTS (1893); 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 242 (1959); W. PROSSER, The
Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS
380 (1953); S. STOLJAR, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1964); P. WINFIELD, TORTS, (1937);
P. WINFIELD, QUAsi-CoNTRACTS (1952); P. WINFIELD, PROVINCE OF THE LAW OF
TORT (1931); F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913); Ames, The History of
Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1888); Seavey & Scott, Restitution,
54 L.Q. REV. 29 (1938).
4 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Introductory Note at 5 (1937).
5 Id.
6 R. JACKSON, THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN ENGLISH LAW 8 (1936);
Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARv. L. REV. 53 (1888); York,
Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 499
(1957).
7 Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1888).
8 J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 166 (1913); O.W. HOLMES, Con-
tract-I. History, in THE COMMON LAW 270 (1881).
9 Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53, 54
(1888); P. WINFIELD, QUASI-CONTRACTS 6 (1952). Slade's Case, 76 Eng. Rep.
1074 (K.B. 1603), is generally reputed to be the precedent for bringing as-
sumpsit without a subsequent promise to pay a prior debt; however, the
Queen's Bench allowed such an action as much as 60 years earlier. J. AMES,
LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 150-52 (1913).
10 Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARv. L. REV. 1, 53, 54
(1888). One of the earliest cases was the Six Carpenters Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
695 (K.B. 1610). W. BLUME, THE AMERICAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8 (1955).
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implied in law or quasi-contract."
In Moses v. Macferian,12 decided in 1760, Lord Mansfield estab-
lished "unjust enrichment" as the basis of the action of indebitatus
assumpsit,13 or quasi-contract as it was later termed, 14 and marked
it as a separate and distinct common law obligation.'5 The chancery
courts, however, were reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction once gained,
and concurrent remedies in equity remained available to a person
who had been deprived of his property by fraud, mistake or duress,
as well as for breach of a fiduciary duty.16 These alternative equita-
ble remedies were by no means ignored,17 due partly to the icy
reception of Moses v. Macferlan by many English lawyers who were
not quite ready for so vague a concept as unjust enrichment.' 8
In America Moses v. Macferlan was gradually accepted, and Dean
Ames drew attention to the availability of the unjust enrichment ac-
tion in his article, "The History of Assumpsit."'9 This article in turn
inspired Dean Keener to publish a short treatise entitled Quasi
Contracts in 1893,20 after which the name, nature, scope and avail-
ability of the action were firmly established in this country.21 Keener
followed Dean Ames' lead 22 and included, besides unjust enrichment,
first a statutory, official or customary duty and second a record
or judgment as the bases of the obligation.23 Analytically these obli-
gations have little in common with unjust enrichment and should
not be classified with it.24 In any event, Keener devoted himself
11 J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 163 (1913). While there were
earlier cases dealing with a customary duty, the foundation case for allowing
indebitatus assumpsit on a promise implied in law without a supporting debt
or contract was Bonnel v. Foulke, 82 Eng. Rep. 1224 (K.B. 1657). Ames, The
History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HAuv. L. Rsv. 1, 53, 54 (1888).
12 97 Eng. Rep. 676.
13 J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 164-65 (1913); J. DAWSON, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 11-15 (1951); 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 252 (1959).
14 Lord Mansfield did refer to the term quasi ex contractu, used in the
Roman law. 97 Eng. Rep. at 678.
15 F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 2 (1914).
16 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Introductory Note at 9 (1937); Ames,
The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1888); York,
Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 499,
510 (1957); see Ripling v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 399, 247 P.2d 117
(1952).
17 See 2 J. STORY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE 605-06 (3d ed. 1886).
18 Friedmann, The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in English Law, 16
CAN. B. REV. 365, 366 (1938).
19 2 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1888).
20 W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893).
21 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 243 (1959). "Moreover, the treatise for the
first time recognized and formally considered a large class of cases which
have not received sufficient treatment, in our law at least, but which deserve
a separate name and a separate classification." Abbot, Book Review, 10
HARV. L. REV. 209 (1896).
22 Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53, 64
(1888).
23 W. KEENER, QUAsI-CONTRACTS 16 (1893); 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE
243 (1959).
24 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 243 (1959) (the only connection between
the three bases for quasi-contract as defined by Keener is historical-procedur-
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solely to the action based on unjust enrichment,25and the inclusion
of these two largely unrelated obligations did not detract from the
beneficial effect of the work. A problem of more lasting character
was his adoption of the title "quasi-contracts," of which more will be
said later.20 It should also be noted that Keener was solely con-
cerned with relief given at law for the prevention of unjust enrich-
ment. He excluded the corresponding equitable relief as well as the
tort remedies which are restitutionary in nature.2 7
Keener's short but influential treatise was followed in 1913 by
Woodward's book of the same title28 which restated and brought the
former work up to date. Woodward ignored other forms of restitu-
tionary relief, but unlike Keener, he did not include judgments or
official and statutory obligations as alternate bases of the action.2 9
The development of restitution has been sporadic and more the
result of attempts to bring new actions within the existing framework
of the common law, than the result of a purely logical progression. 0
While the various equitable remedies and the so-called quasi-con-
tract actions were available to prevent unjust enrichment,31 there was
no recognition of a connection between them.3 2  Thus the quasi-
contract action was in a state of limbo, neither contract nor tort,
lacking any clear place in the fundamental scheme of the law.
33
The first comprehensive attempt to systematically treat this
ubiquitous field of the law was made by the American Law Institute
in the Restatement of Restitution, published in 1937.34 The Restate-
ment reporters, Professors Warren Seavey and Austin Scott, forged
boldly ahead, bringing the great bulk of restitutionary remedies, both
legal and equitable, under the umbrella of "restitution," and declared
"tort," "contract," and "restitution" to be the three primary areas in
al); Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 38 (1938); Abbot, Book Re-
view, 10 HARv. L. REv. 209, 212-15 (1896).
25 W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893).
26 See text accompanying notes 192-212 infra.
27 W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893).
28 F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913).
29 Id. at viii. "It is true that courts of equity, in the exercise of their
jurisdiction to reform and rescind contracts, frequently enforce obligations to
make restitution, but such obligations, while similar in many respects to those
enforced at law, are not commonly regarded as a part of the law of quasi-
contracts. . . ." Id. at 8.
30 See Roske v. Ilykanyics, 232 Minn. 383, 389, 45 N.W.2d 769, 774 (1951);
R. JACKSON, THE ISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH LAW 39 (1936);
Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53 (1893).
31 Note 16 supra.
32 See Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 34-35 (1938).
33 In the early English Law there was no distinction between contract
and tort, and it took some 3 centuries before the two concepts were separated.
W. PRossER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 380 (1953). The addition of a third concept, restitution, seems
to be equally slow, and not until the Restatement of Restitution, published
in 1937, was much consideration given to the possibility of a third category.
See 5 R. PoUND, JURISPRUDENCE 243-44 (1959).
34 Fraser, Introduction to Symposium on the Oklahoma Law of Restitu-
tion, 9 OKLA. L. REV. 301 (1956); Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29,
35 (1938).
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the overall classification of the law.85 The basis of the "restitution"
classification is, of course, unjust enrichment.36 Although the Re-
statement traversed great areas of the law in the material that was
included, it was not a clean sweep.3 7
The appearance of the Restatement of Restitution marks the emer-
gence of this category of the law into adolescence, and true to form, it
trips over its own feet, grows at a phenomenal rate and is today still
somewhat confused as to what it is and where it is supposed to be in
the broad scheme of the law. Using the Restatement as a reference
point, this comment seeks to inquire into the desirability of a separate
category of the law dealing with unjust enrichment situations,38
and to ascertain an appropriate name for such a category.
A logical starting point is to determine the value served by a tri-
partite classification of the law into "tort," "contract," and "restitu-
tion." It will then be asked whether such a tripartite classification
is justifiable in theory and practice. Finally, in the light of the
above two questions, can the Restatement's use of the term "restitu-
tion" as a principal heading in the classification of the law be justi-
fied, and has it been accepted in the American legal system?
Necessity for a Tripartite Classification of the Law Into Tort,
Contract and Restitution
Accepting the judgment of Dean Roscoe Pound, it may be said
that:
Classification is a shaping and developing of traditional systematic
conceptions and traditional systematic categories in order to organize
the body of legal precepts so that they may be (1) stated effectively
with a mnimum of repetition, overlapping and potential conflict,
(2) administered effectively, (3) taught effectively, and (4) devel-
oped effectively for new situations.3 9
Judged in the light of these standards, the Restatement's efforts in
this direction show great promise. First, there is less repetition, over-
35 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. Rnv. 29, 31 (1938). "Actually there
are, of course, no such distinctly segregated compartments of the law. Every-
where the fields of liability and doctrine interlock; everywhere there are
borderlands and penumbras, and cases which cut across arbitrary lines of
division. .. ." W. PaOssEa, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELEcTE
Topics ox THE LAW OF ToRas 380 (1955). Nevertheless, it is useful to divide
the law into categories. See R. PoUND, JupasPRUDENc 21 (1959). The Restate-
ment and this comment are concerned only with the initial classification of
the law, and no attempt will be made to subdivide the three primary cate-
gories. A few of the many subcategories of the law, e.g., constitutional law
or bankruptcy law, are at first glance difficult to classify into any one or
even a combination of the three primary categories. Since most, if not all,
of these are purely statutory, however, the difficulty is insufficient to compel
an increase in the number of primary categories of law to include these spe-
cialized subjects.
36 RESTATEMENT OF RESITuTioN § 1 (1937).
37 Id., General Scope Note at 2; see text accompanying notes 82-121 infra.
38 "Why pull together from all the corners of the law the concept of un-
just enrichment... ?" Macaulay, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L. Rav.
1133 (1959).
39 5 R. PouND, JRIsPRUDENcE 21 (1959).
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lap and potential conflict in dividing the basis of the law into promise,
harm or injury, and unjust enrichment, than in dividing it into
only promise and harm, considering those situations dealing with un-
just enrichment under one or the other, whether or not promise or
harm is pertinent. 40  The latter approach is conducive to confusion,
as a number of cases illustrate.41  This confusion seems to be the
result of an incomplete understanding and acceptance of the basis of
the category and its place in the law.
4 2
40 The only forms of action under the common law were those of tort and
contract. W. KEENER, QUAsI-CONTRACT 14 (1893). The basis of distinction was
that a contract involved the duty to act, while a tort involved the duty to
forbear. J. AMEs, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 160 (1913). Since the new
action based on unjust enrichment involved the duty to act, i.e. return some-
thing to its rightful owner, it was classified with contract. Id. There is little
rational or practical basis for continuing such a classification since a contract
action is based on a promise, express or implied, while the restitution action
is based on unjust enrichment. See McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 527,
531, 36 P.2d 642, 644 (1934); Holdsworth, Unjustifiable Enrichment, 55 L.Q.
REV. 37, 45-53 (1939). While it is sometimes said that a quasi-contract is a
promise implied in law, Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 518, 36 P.2d
635, 638 (1934), the promise is entirely fictitious, and was originally implied
to circumscribe the rigid requirements of common law pleading. Ward v.
Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 743, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (1959). It has been suggested
that the term promise should not be used in connection with quasi-contract.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Introductory Note at 9 (1937).
41 "Long after the modern substantive law of contract had emerged from
the shadows of the forms of action, confusion persisted as to its relations with
quasi-contract. It was difficult to get the quasi-contract cases out of the
contract category until a new category was developed in which to place
them." E. DURFEE & J. DAWSON, CASES ON REMEDIES II RESTITUTION AT LAW
AND IN EQUITY 3 (1939). "The judicial attitude that there can be no recovery
by a plaintiff in default stems in large part from an unwillingness or an in-
ability to distinguish quasi-contract from actual contract . . . ." Lee, The
Plaintiff in Default, 19 VAND. L. Rsv. 1023, 1024 (1966). W. KEENER, QUASI-
CONTRACTS 7 (1893). "The confusion involved in the use of the old phrase
'implied contract' to label both those 'implied in fact' and those 'implied in
law' (now called 'quasi contracts') has not been entirely obliterated. Nor is
it easy to eradicate." Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F.2d 127, 130 n.5 (2d Cir.
1946). "Considerable confusion now exists among the bench and bar as to
the proper classification of this cause of action . . . ." Philpott v. Superior
Ct., 1 Cal, 2d 512, 521, 36 P.2d 635, 639 (1934). The following cases indicate
some degree of confusion: Templeton Patents Ltd. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 220
F. Supp. 48, 60 (S.D. Idaho 1963) (quasi-contract is not a true contract but
partakes of the nature of one); Bartlett v. Raidart, 107 Conn. 691, 142 A. 398
(1928) (confusion between implied in fact and quasi-contract); Hier v. An-
heuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 60 Neb. 320, 83 N.W. 77 (1900) (action for
restitution founded on a contract); Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150
(Tenn. 1966) (contractual relationship). A further difficulty is encountered
where statutes refer to contract express or implied. Stipp v. Doran, 18 F.2d
83 (3d Cir. 1927) (Bankruptcy Act); Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d
534 (1959) (punitive damages); Stone v. Superior Court, 214 Cal. 272, 4 P.2d
777 (1931) (attachment); McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 527, 36 P.2d
642 (1934) (attachment); Johnson v. National Exch. Bank, 124 W. Va. 157,
19 S.E.2d 441 (1942) (jurisdiction of county courts).
42 See Shanks v. Wilson, 86 F. Supp. 789, 794 (S.D. W. Va. 1949) (treats
implied contract, quasi-contract and unjust enrichment as separate and ap-
parently independent theories); Hier v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 60
May 1968]
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Dean Pound's second criterion, effective administration, 43 relates
to the first, in that once the courts and practicing attorneys have a
clear conception of the nature, scope and relation among various ac-
tions and remedies, it is much easier to apply effectively the right
action and remedy to the situation at hand. It is suggested that the
tripartite classification system proposed by the Restatement of Resti-
tution has helped in this regard first, by focusing attention on the
restitutionary remedies44 and second, by delineating their nature, func-
tion, scope and relationship to tort and contract remedies. Even if
the logic supporting such a classification system could be success-
fully refuted the actual result and operation of the system would
still be beneficial.
It is in Dean Pound's third criterion, effective teaching,45 that
the value of a classification of the law into torts, contracts and
restitution is most fully realized. Contract and tort writers tend
to think in terms of consideration and promise, or harm and breach
of a duty. They, at best, treat the restitutionary remedies as alterna-
tives which must be discussed, however briefly, in order to show the
effect they have had on the real subject under consideration, i.e.
the tort or contract action.46 The field of restitution is as compre-
hensive as each of the other two, and it cannot be expected that a
complete statement of the subject would be included in tort or con-
tract treatises or casebooks. In addition, what coverage restitution
does receive in these works concerns only one part of the picture.
The student must look to his torts book to find the alternative resti-
tutionary remedies for misrepresentation and conversion; his con-
tracts book for rescission, fraud, duress and illegal contracts; his
trusts book for constructive trusts; his negotiable instruments book
for payment by mistake in reliance on a forged negotiable instrument;
his agency book for indemnity between principal and agent and for
breach of a fiduciary duty by an agent; his suretyship book for in-
demnity and contribution; his equity book for contracts obtained by
fraud, mistake, or duress; and his property book for ejectment.47 As
Professor John Dawson has said, "[t] he remedies aimed at restitution
of unjust enrichment have grown like Topsy. They could be better
described as a diversified litter of Topsies, with a common parentage
that was only recently discovered. [As a result] . . .many lawyers
still approach restitution remedies with uncertainty and wonder."45
The most expedient solution to this problem is a unified treatment of
Neb. 320, 83 N.W. 77 (1900) (action for restitution founded on a contract);
Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 155 Ohio St. 391, 99 N.E.2d 301
(1951) (quasi-contracts implied in situations involving unjust enrichment or
restitution); see Lee, The Plaintiff in Default, 19 VAwi. L. REv. 1023, 1024
(1966).
43 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1959).
44 Macaulay, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1959).
45 5 R. POUND, JURisPRuDENCE 21 (1959).
46 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, TORTS § 94 (3d ed. 1964), where four and one-
half pages are devoted to restitution; S. WILLIsTON, CONTRACTS (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1957), where "restitution" is dealt with in scattered sections through-
out the work (§§ 348, 536, 538, 898, 912-14, 1454-55, 1458-59, 1460a, 1478-80,
1485, 1600 (f)).
47 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 34-35 (1938).
48 Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 175 (1959).
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the subject. As was aptly pointed out by one recent writer, "[the]
study of restitution as a unit aids in understanding each of the rules
and remedies thereby brought together. Restitution's concepts are
difficult and hardly understood from only a case or a note in a con-
tracts, sales or similar casebook or treatise.149  In addition to the
unified treatment of this subject by the Restatement of Restitution,
recent years have witnessed a few American casebooks on restitu-
tion 0 and some law schools now offer courses in the subject.51 The
battle is by no means won, however, as there has not yet been a com-
prehensive American work to follow the Restatement in this field,52
and the tendency is still to concentrate on the quasi-contract side
of restitution at the expense of the equitable remedies, and to exclude
the tort restitutionary remedies altogether. 3 This tendency is further
manifested by the failure of secondary reference materials to treat
restitution as a separate subject. For example, West Publishing Com-
pany's American Digest System and Corpus Juris Secundum continue
to treat quasi-contract under Contracts,54 Money received,55 and As-
sumpsit;56 constructive trusts under Trusts; 57 and the rest of the resti-
tutionary remedies under an assortment of headings ranging from
Accord to Workmen's Compensation.5  Since courts, attorneys and
students of the law rely heavily on these sources of legal information,
it is difficult for the Restatement's classification system to gain a
foothold.
As to Dean Pound's fourth criterion of classification, effective
development, 59 it cannot be denied that the restitutionary actions
have grown rapidly.60 However, it is submitted that the development
in this area of the law would be more uniform and consistent, with
less overlap and confusion, if the actions and remedies had an ac-
cepted framework within which to expand, rather than growing
19 Macaulay, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1959).
50 2 E. DURFEE & J. DAWSON, CASES ON REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AT LAW
AND IN EQUITY (1939); J. DAWSON & G. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION (1958)
(revision of E. DURFEE & J. DAWSON, supra); E. PATTERSON, CASES ON RESTITU-
TION (1950); E. THURSTON, CASES ON RESTITUTION (1940); J. WADE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1966).
51 For example, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
University of California, Boalt Hall; University of California at Los Angeles;
University of San Francisco; University of Southern California; Cornell Uni-
versity; University of Michigan; University of Chicago; University of Pennsyl-
vania; Northwestern University.
52 Maudsley, Restitution in England, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1123, 1126 (1966).
53 Dean Wade's book, supra note 50 is complete; however, one of the
more recent case books, H. LAUBE, CASES ON QUASI-CONTRACTS (1952), covers
only the quasi-contract side of restitution while E. DURFEE & J. DAwsoN,
supra note 50 included the equitable remedies, but left out the tort restitution-
ary remedies. See also Dawson, Book Review, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 634, 635 (1953).
54 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 6 (1963).
55 58 C.J.S. Money Received §§ 1-33 (1948).
56 7 C.J.S. Assumpsit § 9 (1937).
57 89 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 139-59 (1955).
58 C.J.S. General Index R-Z at 245-47 (1960).
59 5 R. PoUND, JURISPRUDENcE 21 (1959).
00 Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 175, 192 (1959);
Dawson, A Symposium on Restitution, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1019 (1966).
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pell-mell in all directions.61
It thus seems clear that a classification system such as that
suggested by the Restatement of Restitution can be of great benefit
to the law and lawyer alike. Such a system deserves close analysis
and attention so that it may properly guide the growth of restitu-
tionary remedies. As Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone stated:
[A]ny system of law in which legal rules are always created ad hoc
must at its best lack form and symmetry. Its development is not syste-
matic, its precedents which collectively are its substance, because of
the very method of their creation, lack a foundation of scientific and
philosophical generalization on which all systems of law must ulti-
mately rest if they are to endure and do their appointed work.62
It is suggested that the Restatement of Restitution has laid the
groundwork for the "form and symmetry," as well as the "scientific
and philosophical generalization" required by Justice Stone.
Theoretical and Practical Justification of a Tripartite
Classification of the Law
Justification of a tripartite division of the law must neces-
sarily rest on the basis of the division. It is therefore appropriate to
examine closely the basis of division suggested by the Restatement
of Restitution.
The Restatement's division into contract, tort and restitution is
postulated on the theory that the individuals in society have three
"fundamental" interests that the law will protect. 63 These are the
interest in the fulfillment of promises, the interest in freedom from
harm by another, and the interest in having restored a benefit gained
by one person at another's expense if the retention of the benefit by
the other would be unjust.6 4
It is here suggested that one should start with the premise that
the purpose of the law is to adjust the relations between parties in
accordance with what is just.65 That is, there is only one basic inter-
est, justice, on which to base the law, rather than the three interests
used by the Restatement. On such a basis, the first category,
"contracts," includes situations in which a promise, express or im-
plied in fact, is the foundation of the obligation. Thus, assuming it
is just to require persons to perform promises which can be proved
and which do not violate public policy, performance will be enforced
or compensation will be required to place the promisee in approxi-
mately the position he would have held had the promise been per-
formed. The second category, "torts," covers the fact situations of
harm or injury to a person, and a person's interest in things or in
61 "In fact the principal problem which has been faced in evolving the
doctrine [unjust enrichment] has been precisely that of defining the limits
within which it operates." Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law
and Louisiana Law, 36 TuL. L. REV. 605, 607 (1962).
62 Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, in ESSAYS
ON JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE COLU1MBIA LAW REVIEW 131 (1963).
63 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 31 (1938).
64 Id.
65 Dickinson, My Philosophy of Law, in My PHLosoPHY OF LAW 89, 91
(1941); E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 213 (1962); see Pink v. Title Guar. &
Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 167, 8 N.E.2d 321 (1937).
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other persons. Where one party has caused harm or injury to another,
through no fault of the latter, it is just to require that the former
make compensation to repair the harm. The third category, "restitu-
tion," encompasses situations in which one party has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another.
The tripartite classification is based in part on custom and con-
venience. Thus the law is divided to deal with fact situations in
the most efficient and useful way, within the criteria for a classifica-
tion system suggested by Dean Pound. Note that this division may or
may not conform to the strict mandates of "pure logic," but logic is
not the primary reason for, or basis of, the division.6
While the Restatement's basis undoubtedly accomplishes the same
purpose as a division based on one interest to be protected, i.e. that of
just treatment from other members of society with the divisions of
the law based on three types of fact situations, it would be more
accurate and more logically consistent with modern practice to adopt
the latter view. For example, where the individual who has received
unjust enrichment of some type has an election between tort and
contract,67 tort and restitution,68 contract and restitution,60 or among
all three,7 0 it seems difficult to argue that there are different and, by
implication, mutually exclusive interests being protected. Under
the "one interest" theory, on the other hand, the law would protect
the plaintiff's right to just treatment at the hands of other members
of society, and, subject to the rules for election of remedies, the plain-
tiff could plead, or the court would apply, the appropriate remedy
according to the facts pleaded and proved. If the particular set of
facts, then, fell under more than one division it would do no violence
to the classification system regardless of what theory of recovery is
finally applied. The "one interest" theory also seems more con-
sistent with modern code pleading and is more conducive to growth
since there would be greater flexibility throughout the system. In
addition, this more direct approach might prevent further unfortun-
ate fictions from arising, similar to those which have been invented
by the courts in the past to cope with divisions and remedies of the
legal system that have proved too inflexible to adapt to the changing
conditions of society.7 1
It has been contended that "unjust enrichment" is an excessively
vague concept upon which to base a category of the law, that it is
so broad as to be meaningless. 72 If such is true, the same is true of the
66 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1959).
67 W. PROSSER, ToRTS § 93 (3d ed. 1964); P. Wnq=rtD, TORTS 7 (1937).
68 Cawthon v. Bancokentucky Co., 52 F.2d 850 (W.D. Ky. 1931); W. PRos-
sER, TORTS § 94 (3d ed. 1964).
69 Rains v. Arnett, 189 Cal. App. 2d 337, 11 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1961); Lucy
v. Lucy, 22 Cal. App. 2d 629, 71 P.2d 949 (1937); Locke v. Duchesnay, 84 Cal.
App. 448, 258 P. 418 (1927).
70 Glantz v. Freedman, 100 Cal. App. 611, 280 P. 704 (1929).
71 The most obvious example is the connection between actions based on
unjust enrichment and contract. Seekamp v. Small, 39 Wash. 2d 578, 237 P.2d
489 (1951).
72 Holdsworth, Unjustifiable Enrichment, 55 L.Q. REV. 37, 48-49 (1939);
E. JwNs, THE NEW JURIsPRUmxCE 268 (1933). See also the exchange between
Dean Abbot, Book Review, 10 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1896), and Learned Hand,
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premises on which contract and tort are based.73  "Unjust enrich-
ment" can scarcely be broader than "harm," and "promise" has been
defined only after centuries of litigation. It is further submitted that
the premise behind a principal category of the law must be broad
enough to encompass the primary areas in the classification of the
law. It is also true that a category of law cannot be defined in one
or two sentences.7 4 Only after extensive rules relating to the various
types of fact situations within the category have been developed and
refined, can the category be defined with any degree of accuracy,75
and even then new situations are constantly arising which require
reexamination of the various actions and remedies involved.
Scope of the Category
It is appropriate at this point to determine precisely what the
category of restitution should entail. As defined by the Restatement,
restitution includes: first, those situations where recovery is allowed
because property is transferred or services are rendered by mistake; 76
second, where a benefit is conferred upon another through coercion;7
third, where money or property is transferred in expectation of re-
ceiving something which is not in fact obtained;73 fourth, where a
benefit is conferred without mistake, coercion or request but public
policy sanctions recovery;7 fifth, where a benefit was acquired (right-
fully or wrongfully) without any act by the claimant for which the
benefited party should account either in quasi-contract or construc-
tive trust80
Keeping in mind that the basis of the category is unjust enrich-
ment, one might ask two preliminary questions which are actually two
sides of the same coin. First, is the category, "restitution," all-in-
clusive, i.e. are all those situations covered in which the defendant
has been unjustly enriched? Second, should the category be com-
plete and all-inclusive, i.e. are there some situations in which the
defendant has been unjustly enriched which ought not to be in-
cluded in the "restitution" category for reasons of logic, procedure or
convenience?
In answer to the first question, the category, as promulgated by
the Restatement of Restitution, is not complete. The Restatement
does not include the restitutionary tort remedies or the resitu-
tionary rights which arise from breach of contract or trust.8 '
With reference to the second question, the principal areas of
contention are the two excluded groups above and the merger of legal
Restitution or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARV. L. REV. 249 (1898), where Judge
Hand successfully defended unjust enrichment as the basis of the quasi-con-
tract action.
73 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 31 (1938).
74 Id.
75 Williams, Language and the Law-Il, 61 L.Q. REv. 179, 193 (1945).
76 RESTATEMENT or RESTrruTIoN, Introductory Note at 1, 2 (1936).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 RESTATEMENT or RESTITUTION, General Scope Note at 2 (1936).
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and equitable actions by the Restatement.
Regarding the restitutionary tort remedies, a preliminary distinc-
tion should be made between the alternative restitutionary actions
available for the commission of some torts, and the "tort" remedies
which are themselves actually restitutionary in nature.
The more serious problem and one that has received very little
consideration from legal writers is whether some of the remedies that
have traditionally been considered under the heading of torts, could
be better understood and administered under restitution. The reme-
dies in question are ejectment, replevin, detinue and trover.8 2
Ejectment, although technically considered a tort remedy,8 3 is
generally dealt with in property law.8 4 In view of the fact that the
remedy is largely regulated by statute today,8 5 and that the determi-
native issue is one of title rather than of unjust enrichment,8 6 it does
not appear that any advantage would result from uprooting the
remedy of ejectment from its present position and including it under
restitution.
In the case of trover and detinue, the same conclusion should
probably be reached, although the argument is not so strong. In
practice these two remedies have been largely superseded by the
tort remedy of conversion.8 7 While most actions of conversion could
be explained on the basis of unjust enrichment,88 they may also be
viewed through the tort basis of harm to a person's property,89 al-
though the latter approaches the realm of fiction. Conversion is ex-
tremely technical in its rules,90 and even Dean Prosser has been
unable to find a satisfactory definition91 for the action. It is per-
haps arguable that had the category of restitution been established
100 years ago, most of those situations which now come under conver-
sion would better have been placed under restitution on the basis of
unjust enrichment. However, at the present time it would seem to be
an almost insurmountable task to reclassify the action of conversion.
82 See Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 38 (1938); Thurston,
Recent Developments in Restitution: 1940-1947, 45 MIcH. L. REV. 935, 936
(1947).
83 17 CAL. JuR. 2d Ejectment § 2 (1954).
84 1 R. AiGLER, A. SmiT & S. TEFFT, CASES ON PROPERTY 26 (1960); 3 R.
PoWELL, REAL PROPERTY 453-54 (1967); 6 id. 1027 (1965); RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY § 222 (1936); see Thurston, Recent Developments in Restitution:
1940-1947, 45 MciC. L. REV. 935, 936 (1947).
85 28 C.J.S. Ejectment § 3 (1941).
86 17 CAL. JuR. 2d Ejectment § 2 (1954). Theoretically, only the right to
possession and not title is at issue; however, title is frequently the basis of
the claim. 28 C.J.S. Ejectment § 4 (1941).
s W. PROSSER, TORTs § 15, at 80-81 (3d ed. 1964). Conversion grew out
of trover and is more a new name than a new action. Id. at 79. However,
detinue is a separate action which has fallen into disuse. Id. at 80.
88 Cawthon v. Bancokentucky Co., 52 F.2d 850 (W.D. Ky. 1931); Seavey
& Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 38 (1938); Dawson, Book Review, 38
CORNELL L.Q. 634, 635 (1953) (argues for inclusion of conversion in the cate-
gory of restitution).
89 W. PROSSEa, TORTS § 15, at 81 (3d ed. 1964); Seavey & Scott, Restitution,
54 L.Q. REv. 29, 38 (1938).
90 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 15, at 79 (3d ed. 1964).
91 Id.
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First, the technical rules which have developed around the action are
in many cases inapplicable to a restitutionary remedy;9 2 and second,
some situations in which recovery is allowed under conversion are not
based on unjust enrichment and could not logically be included in
the category of restitution.9 3 In addition, restitutionary remedies are
available as alternatives to conversion,94 allowing the plaintiff a
choice of basing his action on unjust enrichment or on harm.
Replevin is in much the same situation as the other restitutionary
tort remedies; alternative restitutionary remedies are available, 95
and it would not appear that any useful purpose could be served by
transferring its classification from tort to restitution.96
It may be argued that the exclusion of these restitutionary tort
remedies of ejectment, detinue, trover and replevin from the restitu-
tion category is logically inconsistent as they clearly involve unjust
enrichment.97 However, as previously suggested,98 modern classifi-
cation of the law is not based exclusively on logic, but depends
principally on how the material can be arranged to make it more
useful and easily understood.9 9 Furthermore an attempt to uproot
these well-established tort actions and place them under restitution
would cause rather than eliminate confusion, for each group of reme-
dies may have a different statute of limitations,100 a different rule of
survival,10 1 and a different measure of recovery.10 2  In addition the
plaintiff may now often avoid procedural pitfalls by electing to pur-
sue one action or the other,10 3 while the inclusion of the tort restitu-
92 The most important of these technicalities is the basic theory of the
action that a forced judicial sale will be made. That is, the plaintiff is not
required to accept the return of the thing with which the defendant inter-
fered, and the defendant is considered to have "bought" it. W. PRossER,
ToRTs § 15, at 80 (3d ed. 1964).
93 For example, the plaintiff can recover against a defendant who found
a lost chattel, made a good faith attempt to return it to the rightful owner,
but mistakenly delivered it to the wrong party. Id. § 15, at 87-88. Obviously
a recovery in this situation cannot be grounded on unjust enrichment.
94 Austin v. Wilcoxson, 149 Cal. 24, 26, 84 P. 417, 417 (1906); Bastanchury
v. Times-Mirror Co., 68 Cal. App. 2d 217, 156 P.2d 488 (1945); Glantz v.
Freedman, 100 Cal. App. 611, 280 P. 704 (1929); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.,
26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946).
95 See Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 38 (1938).
96 But see Dawson, Book Review, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 634, 635 (1953) (argues
for inclusion of replevin in category of restitution).
97 Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L.
REV. 223, 228 (1936) (not illogical); Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L. Q. REV.
29, 38 (1938); cf. Thurston, Recent Developments in Restitution: 1940-1947,
45 MicH. L. REV. 935, 936 (1947).
98 Text accompanying note 39 supra.
99 5 R. PoUND, JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1959).
100 Restitution actions have usually been considered contract actions for
the purpose of the statute of limitations, Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d
512, 36 P.2d 635 (1934), and the tort statute of limitations is usually shorter
than the limitation on contract actions. Compare CAL. CoDE CIV. PRoc. § 338,
with CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 337.
101 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 120, at 921 (3d ed. 1964).
102 Id. § 93, at 640-41.
103 Id. § 93, at 639-43; York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the
Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499, 546 (1957).
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tionary actions in the category of restitution might, as in the legal-
equitable merger,0 4 reduce the differences between them, and ren-
der the system less flexible.
The alternative restitutionary actions for the commission of a tort
are well known by the phrase "waive the tort and sue in assump-
sit."'1 5 This phrase, however, includes both contract and restitu-
tionary situations' 0 and is subject to the confusion between contract
and quasi-contract referred to previously. 0 7 In any event, it is well
established that restitutionary actions, legal and equitable, are avail-
able where the defendant tortfeasor has been unjustly enriched, 0 8
and, although the subject has not received as much attention from
legal writers as it probably deserves, there appears to be little
problem in this area.
The second group omitted by the Restatement involves the alter-
native restitutionary actions for the breach of a contract or trust.
Except where a constructive trust could be applied, the Restatement
of Restitution did not consider these actions since they had previ-
ously been covered in the Restatement of Contracts and Restatement
of Trusts.0 0 However, the situations concerned are clearly within
the scope of restitution,110 and could properly be included in any com-
prehensive work on the subject.
There are some problems remaining in this area, including the
use of the term "rescission,""' whether punitive damages will be
allowed in addition to restitution on a quasi-contractual claim,112 and
104 See text accompanying note 120-25 infra.
105 Glantz v. Freedman, 100 Cal. App. 611, 280 P. 704 (1929); Olwell v.
Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652, 653 (1947); Johnson v. Na-
tional Exch. Bank, 124 W. Va. 157, 19 S.E.2d 441 (1942); Corbin, Waiver of Tort
and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221 (1910).
106 7 C.J.S. Assumpsit §§ 2, 9 (1937); 1 CAL. JuR. 2d Actions § 31 (1952);
5 id. Assumpsit § 11 (1967); see Hallidte v. Enginger, 175 Cal. 505, 166 P. 1
(1917).
107 Note 41 supra.
108 Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221 (1910);
Keener, Waiver of Tort, 6 HARv. L. REv. 223 (1892); Teller, Restitution as an
Alternative Remedy for a Tort, 2 N.Y.L.F. 40 (1956); York, Extension of Resti-
tutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499 (1957).
109 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, General Scope Note at 2 (1936).
110 Fitzhugh v. University Realty Co., 46 Cal. App. 198, 201, 188 P. 1023,
1024 (1920); Bollenback v. Continental Cas. Co., 243 Ore. 498, 414 P.2d 802
(1966); Duffy v. Scott, 235 Wis. 142, 292 N.W. 273 (1940); E.L. Husting Co. v.
Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 237 N.W. 85, cert. denied, 285 U.S. 538 (1931);
3 S. WmLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 1455 at 2589 (Rev. ed. S. Williston & G. Thompson
1936); F. WOODwARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 410-11 (1913).
"' McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 527, 535, 36 P.2d 642, 646 (1934).
112 In a most interesting California case, Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736,
336 P.2d 534 (1959), Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the majority of the
court, allowed the plaintiff to collect punitive damages although restitution
formed the basis of his claim. The action was originally brought in tort for
fraud against a real estate broker who, by misrepresenting himself as the
agent of the seller, fraudulently made a $72,000 profit. The plaintiff was
awarded the $72,000 profit and $36,000 punitive damages. The unusual facet
of the case is that the land was worth the amount paid by the plaintiff. Since
there was no out of pocket loss and no damage, the California Supreme Court
denied the tort basis of recovery. However, the court allowed recovery on
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the failure of some courts to recognize the distinction between an
action for damages and an action for restitution. 13 At least part
of the uncertainty in dealing with the available remedies for breach
of contract stems from the familiar confusion between contract and
quasi-contract. 1 4 A separate treatment of the restitutionary alterna-
tive actions might help to alleviate confusion and facilitate develop-
ment in the areas mentioned above. As to what actions are available,
it would appear that in the case of a substantial breach of contract
or failure of consideration, the plaintiff has the election of suing for
specific performance (where applicable), damages for the breach, or
for one of the restitutionary remedies."15
Woodward seemed to be concerned as to whether the election to
bring an action for restitution is based on a primary or secondary
obligation;1 6 however, it is submitted that the question is immaterial
in light of the tripartite classification suggested by the Restatement of
Restitution. That is, tort, contract and restitution are coequal alterna-
tive primary rights; the important question is whether the plaintiff
wishes to enforce the contract and go forward by specific performance,
to be compensated for the failure of the other party to perform by
damages, or to be returned more or less to his previously held position
through recovery of that by which the plaintiff has been unjustly
enriched.
The Coalescing of Law and Equity
The third and last area of contention is the merger of legal and
equitable actions. The Restatement of Restitution included in the
"restitution" category both the legal action of quasi-contract and the
equitable remedies of constructive trust, equitable lien, subrogation
and accounting.1 7  These equitable remedies had developed inde-
the basis of unjust enrichment, referring to both quasi-contract and construc-
tive trust. Concluding that quasi-contract is not the same as contract, the
punitive damages award was allowed to stand on the basis of CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3294 (which allows punitive damages for fraud or malice but not under
contract), saying, "[s]uch damages [punitive] are appropriate in cases like
the present one, where restitution would have little or no deterrent effect
.... " Id. at 743, 336 P.2d at 538. The case is noted in 48 CALiF. L. REV. 342
(1960), where the writer said that this was the first time punitive damages
had been awarded in such a case. It is uncertain whether the case is author-
ity for allowing punitive damages only where the theory of recovery is a
constructive trust, where it is quasi-contract, or in any action grounded on
unjust enrichment. In any event, the case raises the question as to the com-
patibility of punitive damages and recovery based on unjust enrichment.
113 Frank v. Tavares, 142 Cal. App. 2d 683, 689, 298 P.2d 887, 891 (1956)
("and a common count is sufficient basis for the finding of a quasi contract
in the award of damages for unjust enrichment" (emphasis added)); Bollen-
back v. Continental Cas. Co., 243 Ore. 498, 514, 414 P.2d 802, 809 (1966)(recognized the problem); Lee, The Plaintiff in Default, 19 VAND. L. REV.
1023, 1024 (1966).
114 Note 41 supra.
15 See Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 37 (1938).
116 F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTACTS § 438 (1913).
117 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, General Scope Note at 1-2 (1936);
Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 40 (1938).
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pendent of, but paralleling, quasi-contract," s to accomplish the same
end, the prevention of unjust enrichment. Thus it is almost axio-
matic that the two be considered together." 9 Professors Seavey
and Scott have said:
That there is no fundamental difference between the restitutional
rights enforced at law and those enforced in equity can be demon-
strated only by a comparison of the cases; such a comparison indicates
that the principles used by both Courts are the same, although for
various reasons a suitor may not be able to get into one of the Courts
or, because of procedural reasons, he may obtain less in one than in
the other.120
At the time the Restatement of Restitution was published in 1936,
there was still some reluctance on the part of the courts to accept a
fusion of legal and equitable remedies, despite procedural reforms
theoretically merging the two concepts.1 2 ' Such hesitation is nei-
ther reasonable nor advantageous. As Professors Seavey and Scott
persuasively argue:
It may be that for many purposes it is desirable still to keep distinct
the functions of the two Courts [law and equity], but certainly it is
not rational, except so far as differences in procedure require it, and
they seldom do, for two co-ordinate Courts in the same jurisdiction to
reach different results upon the same set of facts. A statement of
rules stated to be applicable to both will have a tendency to lessen
the few remaining differences. 122
Recent courts have generally agreed with this reasoning-perhaps the
best statement appearing in Anderson v. Bell: 23 "'It may well be
said that we have but one system of law, consisting of the common
law, insofar as applicable, statute law, and principles of equity
.' 'In reality the distinction between the two classes of remedies
is more or less arbitrary and groundless'.' ' 24 There seems to be
little current argument in this country concerning the coalescence of
legal and equitable remedies in restitution, and the situation is
summarized in cogent form by one recent writer:
Thus the two independently developed means of preventing unjust
enrichment--quasi-contracts on the one hand, and equitable restitu-
tion by means of constructive trusts, accounting, subrogation, etc., on
the other-are [all] gradually drawn together by procedural reforms,
interborrowing of theory, and combined textual treatments. It is
here that can be observed the continuing synthesis of the modern law
of Restitution.125
118 Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1888); Pat-
terson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. REV. 223,
229 (1936); York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499, 510, 548 (1957).
119 See Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1
Mo. L. REv. 223, 229 (1936).
120 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 39 (1938).
121 McCleary, Damage as Requisite to Rescission for Misrepresentation,
36 McH. L. Rsv. 1 (1937); Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. RFv. 223, 229 (1936); Philpott v. Superior Court, I Cal.
2d 512, 514-15, 36 P.2d 635, 636-37 (1934).
122 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 40 (1938).
123 70 Wyo. 471, 251 P.2d 572 (1952).
124 Id. at 485, 251 P.2d at 576, quoting Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 244,
73 P.2d 953, 960 (1937), and Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 515, 36
P.2d 635, 637 (1934).
125 York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499, 548 (1957).
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The law of restitution, then, is the law relating to all claims
which are founded on the principle of unjust enrichment. Although
restitutionary remedies often accomplish different things and ap-
ply to a wide variety of situations, there is no reason why the ap-
propriate restitutionary remedy cannot be used in any situation
where rules of policy and procedure would allow the plaintiff re-
covery,12 6 whether or not another remedy is available.127 In this re-
gard, the scope of the category of restitution is still unsettled.128
Ideological acceptance of a tripartite classification with one cate-
gory based on unjust enrichment is only a little more than 3 decades
old,'129 and it remains to be seen where the outer limits of the cate-
gory will be found.130  For example, some legal writers have advo-
cated the further extension of restitution into the area of tort,131
while others have argued that the category should be limited to
those situations which do not fall within the purview of tort or con-
tract.132 It would appear that only time and experience can deter-
mine the scope of the category of restitution. In any event, it cannot
be denied that such a category of law does exist and has received
substantial acceptance in the American legal system.133
Terminology of Restituion
Of the terms used in connection with the subject of restitution,
"assumpsit" is one of the oldest 3 4 and also perhaps one of the most
126 J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 112-13 (1951); Wade, Restitution
for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 Vu N. L. REV. 1183 (1966).
127 Austin v. Wilcoxson, 149 Cal. 24, 26, 84 P. 417, 417 (1906); Bastanchury
v. Times-Mirror Co., 68 Cal. App. 2d 217, 156 P.2d 488 (1945); Glantz v.
Freedman, 100 Cal. App. 611, 280 P. 704 (1929); Ohwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.,
26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946); Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in
Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221 (1910); Keener, Waiver of Tort, 6 HARv. L. REv.
223 (1892); Teller, Restitution as an Alternative Remedy, 2 N.Y.L.F. 40 (1956);
York, Extention of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
499, 548 (1957).
128 Fraser, Introduction to Symposium on the Oklahoma Law of Restitu-
tion 9 OKLA. L. REv. 301 (1956); see York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies
in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499, 510 (1957).
129 The Restatement of Restitution was published in 1937; see Dawson,
Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1959).
130 See Fraser, Introduction to Symposium on the Oklahoma Law of Res-
titution, 9 OKLA. L. REv. 301, 302 (1956) (argues for extension of recovery
based on unjust enrichment).
'31 Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HAnv. L. REv. 401
(1959); York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499 (1957); Dawson, Book Review, 38 Com, rL L.Q. 634, 635
(1953).
132 See R. JACKSON, THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN ENGLISH LAW 127
(1936).
133 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 244 (1959); Maudsley, Restitution in
England, 19 VAND. L. Rrv. 1123, 1126 (1966); Thurston, Recent Developments
in Restitution: 1940-1947, 45 MicH. L. REV. 935 (1947); Wade, Restitution for
Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1966); Wright,
The Study of Law, 54 L.Q. REV. 185, 195 (1938); Mechem, Book Review, 25
IowA L. REv. 187 (1939); cf. Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co., [1954] 3 D.L.R.
785 (Can. 1954).
134 J. AMEs, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 163-66 (1913).
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troublesome. Although a great deal of restitutional law developed
under the wing of indebitatus assumpsit, 3 5 the term has long since
lost its potency, at least in relation to restitution. One cannot help
but wonder how much more lucid our law would be today, and how
many problems in the area of restitution could have been avoided,
had the term been jettisoned years ago. There are two major objec-
tions to the term "assumpsit."
First, the word has been used to encompass a huge area of the
law' 30 and was developed more to facilitate the requirements of com-
mon law pleading and jurisdiction than to serve as a subcategory of
the law.137 That is, in order to allow new actions based on unjust
enrichment, assumpsit was expanded to extend the jurisdiction of the
common law courts. 38 Today such devices are unnecessary, 3 9 and
the word, "assumpsit," should be either eliminated or restricted to
pure contract actions. "Assumpsit" means to assume or undertake; 140
thus "indebitatus assumpsit" means literally an assumed indebted-
ness14"-a meaning which does not seem appropriate to an unjust en-
richment action.
Second, assumpsit and indebitatus assumpsit tend to perpetuate
the fallacious connection between contract situations and those deal-
ing with unjust enrichment,'1 42 a connection which was the result of
considering both implied in fact contracts and the so-called implied
in law contracts or quasi-contracts under general assumpsit.1 43 Even
those states that have abolished the common law forms of action
continue, for the most part, to treat restitution actions as though
they were actions on a contract with respect to the statute of limita-
tions,144 counterclaims or set-offs, 1 45 assignments of rights of action,146
135 Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARv. L. REV. 53, 68-69
(1888).
130 In addition to its original use in tort (text accompanying note 8 supra)
"assumpsit" covers contracts (text accompanying notes 9-10 supra) as well
as quasi-contracts (text accompanying note 11 supra). See Laughlin v. Boat-
man's Nat'l Bank, 354 Mo. 467, 476, 189 S.W.2d 974, 979 (1945).
137 7 C.J.S. Assumpsit § 9 (1937); Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV.
29, 33 (1938); see Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HAav. L. REV.
1, 53 (1888).
138 Lewinsohn, Contract Distinguished From Quasi Contract, 2 CAIaF. L.
REV. 171, 190 (1914).
139 Under modern code pleading, the plaintiff can generally state the facts
and the court will apply the appropriate relief. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a),
8 (e) (1); C.E. CLARK, A New Federal Civil Procedure, in PRocEDURE--THE
HANDMAID OF JUSTICE 51 (1965).
140 "Assumpsit" is derived from the Latin word "assumere" meaning to
assume or undertake. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 168 (2d ed.
1951).
141 "Indebitatus" means indebted. BALLENTnE LAW DICTIONARY 629 (2d
ed. 1948).
142 Note 41 supra.
143 Indiana Harbor Belt Ry. v. Calumet City, 391 ll. 280, 63 N.E.2d 369
(1945).
144 Templeton Patents Ltd. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 220 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.
Idaho 1963); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 5 (1936).
145 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 5, comment b at 23 (1936).
146 Id.
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joinder,147 attachments 4 and survival.' 4 Considering the basic dif-
ference between contract actions and restitution actions, where the
former concern an obligation voluntarily assumed,'50 while the latter
concern an obligation imposed by law,151 the procedural treatment of
restitution actions as contract actions is questionable at best. It is
suggested that, along with dropping the restitutionary application of
the terms "assumpsit" and "indebitatus assumpsit," new procedural
rules should be formulated for the restitution actions, divorcing them
from contract rules. In accordance with this view, it is also thought
that it would be beneficial if legal digests and encyclopedias would
index and classify the subject under the unified heading of restitu-
tion,152 rather than under the present diversity of titles.15 3
A second undesirable term is "implied contract." There is little
logical or practical justification for its usage in connection with the
subject of restitution. The term originally referred to implied in
fact contracts.154 Its later application to unjust enrichment situations
was achieved through the use of a fictional promise allowing the
new action to be brought under the writ of assumpsit 55 The no-
tion that there is an implied contract in unjust enrichment situations
has had a profound effect on the development of this area of the
law.156 Although perhaps a necessary concept in the beginning, it has
caused considerable confusion between contract and restitution 57
and should no longer be retained.
A third term that deserves mention is "money had and received."
The term designates a form of action in assumpsit based on a quasi-
contractual obligation 15s but is restricted to situations where a per-
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See 1 S. WLLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1, 1A (Rev. ed. S. Williston & G.
Thompson 1936).
151 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTiON § 1 (1936).
152 Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 257 (1954) ("Resti-
tution is a term unknown to legal treatises, encyclopedias and digests . ").
153 In Corpus Juris Secundum, for example, the major indexing titles for
restitutionary actions are: 7 C.J.S. Assumpsit § 9 (1937); 17 C.J.S. Contracts
§ 6 (1963); 58 C.J.S. Money Received §§ 1-33 (1948). Also see C.J.S. General
Index R-Z at 245-47 (1960).
154 See Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HAnv. L. REV. 1, 53-
54 (1888).
155 J. AMES, LEcTuREs ON LEaAL HISTORY 163 (1913); see General Acci-
dent Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Bergquist, 15 Wis. 2d 166, 111 N.W.2d 900
(1961).
156 The primary effect has been that the action is treated procedurally
as a contract action. Notes 144-49 supra.
157 Note 41 supra.
158 "The action for money had and received was invented by the com-
mon-law judges to secure relief from the narrower restrictions of the com-
mon-law procedure, which afforded no remedy in too many cases of merit.
The action is a modified form of assumpsit. It has gone through various
transformations; first, from tort, then from contract, and afterwards into a
remedy where there was technically neither tort nor contract. It is founded
on the principle that no one ought unjustly to enrich himself at the expense
of another, and the gist of the action is that the defendant has received money
which in equity and good conscience should have been paid to the plaintiff,
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son has been unjustly enriched by the retention of money or its
equivalent. 5 9  The difficulty is that there has been an unfortunate
tendency by the courts to use the terms quasi-contract, implied con-
tract and indebitatus assumpsit, in addition to money had and received
in discussing the same type of fact situation. 6 0 This duplication is
unnecessary and confusing.' 61 In light of the need for a modern
terminology of restitution, use of the term "money had and re-
ceived" should be reconsidered.
Quasi-Contract, Unjust Enrichment and Restitution
A more difficult task is clarifying the meaning and usage of the
terms "quasi-contract," "unjust enrichment," and "restitution." There
is considerable disagreement as to what the terms themselves mean,
and what, if any, distinctions exist between them.
The most modem manifestation of this confusion has been the
statement in a handful of cases since the Restatement of Restitution
to the effect that the terms "restitution" and "unjust enrichment"
are the modem designation for the older doctrine of "quasi-con-
tract."' 62 While it might be argued that unjust enrichment is syn-
and under such circumstances that he ought, by the ties of natural justice, to
pay it over." Seekamp v. Small, 39 Wash. 2d 578, 584, 237 P.2d 489, 493 (1951),
quoting Bosworth v. Wolfe, 146 Wash. 615, 623-24, 264 P. 413, 417 (1928);
accord, Herrmann v. Gleason, 126 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1942); Board of Trustees
v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 337 Ill. App. 183, 85 N.E.2d 473 (1949); King County
v. Odman, 8 Wash. 2d 32, 111 P.2d 228 (1941); Arjay Inv. Co. v. Kohlmetz, 9
Wis. 2d 535, 101 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1960) (where the court states that to fit
the theory of quasi-contract into the old forms of action, it was called money
had and received); Federal Corp. v. Radtke, 229 Wis. 231, 281 N.W. 921 (1938);
see 58 C.J.S. Money Received § 1 (1948).
159 Canepa v. Sun Pac. Inc., 126 Cal. App. 2d 706, 272 P.2d 860 (1954).
100 Herrmann v. Gleason, 126 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1942); Austin v. Wilcox-
son, 149 Cal. 24, 26, 84 P. 417, 417 (1906); King County v. Odman, 8 Wash. 2d
32, 111 P. 2d 228 (1941); Bosworth v. Wolfe, 146 Wash. 615, 264 P. 413 (1928);
Federal Corp. v. Radtke, 229 Wis. 231, 281 N.W. 921 (1938).
161 "[I]n the Restatement Ewe find] the perpetuation of the time-worn
nomenclature, the quasi-contractual remedies .... Is this inevitable? One
can find the underlying principle of all these remedies, and draw up a classi-
fication which emphasizes those situations where unjust enrichment occurs
and where it is or ought to be remedied; but if, because of the precedents, the
remedies have to retain their old names, the chains of the past remain to
distract and sometimes confuse." Waters, The English Constructive Trust: A
Look into the Future, 19 Vmn. L. REv. 1215, 1219 (1966). Herrmann v. Glea-
son, 126 F.2d 936, 939 (6th Cir. 1942) (confusing discussion using the terms
"assumpsit," "implied in law contract," "quasi-contract," "money had and
received" and "restitution"); Wilson Cypress Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
109 F.2d 623 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 653 (1940) (after dismissal of
earlier action in restitution, plaintiff brought action for money had and re-
ceived which was properly dismissed by the court as res judicata); Ripling v.
Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 399, 247 P.2d 117 (1952) (dispute between
parties on right to jury trial).
162 Gladowski v. Felczak, 346 Pa. 660, 31 A.2d 718 (1943); Bill v. Gat-
tarara, 34 Wash. 2d 645, 209 P.2d 457 (1949); Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327,
281 P.2d 1042 (1955); Smith v. Stowell, 256 Iowa 165, 125 N.W.2d 795 (1964);
Martin v. Bozeman, 173 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 1965); Guldberg v. Greenfield,
- Iowa -, 146 N.W.2d 298 (1966).
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onymous with restitution, there seems to be little basis for consider-
ing quasi-contract the same as the other two. Specifically, quasi-
contract, since its inception, has been limited to actions at law,16 3 while
restitution and unjust enrichment have, at least since the Restate-
ment of Restitution, included both legal and equitable remedies.0 4
An analysis of the cases in which the above statement has ap-
peared sheds additional light on the problem. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in Gladowski v. Felczak, decided in 1943,165 first ex-
pressed the idea that the terms "restitution," "unjust enrichment"
and "quasi-contract" are synonymous: "This case involves the appli-
cation of the doctrines of 'unjust enrichment' and 'restitution'-mod-
ern terms of legal nomenclature which have come largely to supplant
the former designation of 'quasi-contract.'"166 No authority was
cited for this statement, and it would appear that there was none.
Unfortunately the statement was not explained, and it would ap-
pear that the idea expressed therein was not necessary to the holding
in the case, so that in addition to being unfounded in logic or prece-
dent, the statement was dictum. In defense of the court, though, the
case was decided only 7 years after the Restatement of Restitution
was published,16' 7 and the classification and terminology expressed
in the Restatement were still relatively new to the American legal pro-
fession. The court relied on the Restatement in finding an equitable
lien on real property, 68 and one of the Restatement sections quoted
in the case does use the terms, "restitution" and "unjust enrich-
ment" to cover a quasi-contractual situation. 69
Six years later a similar statement was used in Bill v. Gatta-
vara 7 0 In dictum, the court stated "the terms 'restitution' and 'un-
just enrichment' are the modern designations for the older doctrine
of 'quasi contracts.'"
Hixon v. Allphin'71 then made a similar statement, quoting Bill v.
Gattavara and citing Corpus Juris which does not support it. 1' 2 Corpus
Juris Secundum, however, adopted the statement, citing Hixon v.
Allphin and Bill v. Gattavara.'7 3 Nine years later, in Smith v. Stow-
ell,'74 the statement was made that "'[r]estitution' and 'unjust en-
richment' are modern designations for the older doctrine of quasi
contracts or contracts implied in law, sometimes called constructive
contracts."'1 5 The court cited City of Pella v. Fowler'76 as author-
163 Independent School Dist. v. City of White Bear Lake, 208 Minn. 29,
35, 292 N.W. 777, 781 (1940).
164 Anderson v. Bell, 70 Wyo. 471, 251 P.2d 572 (1952).
165 346 Pa. 660, 31 A.2d 718 (1943).
166 Gladowski v. Felczak, 346 Pa. 660, 661, 31 A.2d 718, 719 (1943).
167 The Restatement of Restitution was first published in 1937.
168 Gladowski v. Felczak, 346 Pa. 660, 663, 31 A.2d 718, 720 (1942).
169 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 43 (1937).
170 34 Wash. 2d 645, 650, 209 P.2d 457, 460 (1949).
171 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955).
172 Id. at 333, 281 P.2d at 1045; 66 C.J. Unjust Enrichment at 32 (1934)
(unjust enrichment is the foundation for most quasi-contracts).
173 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 6, at 571 (1963). See also 46 Am. Jun. Restitu-
tion and Unjust Enrichment at 13 (Supp. 1967).
174 256 Iowa 165, 125 N.W.2d 795 (1964).
175 Id. at 173, 125 N.W.2d at 799-800.
176 215 Iowa 90, 244 N.W. 734 (1932).
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ity; however, the Fowler case does not support this statement 7 7 The
following year, a similar expression was made in Martin v. Boze-
man,178 relying on Corpus Juris Secondum.179 Finally in Guldberg
v. Greenfield,18 0 the court said, "'restitution' and 'unjust enrichment'
are modern designations for the older terms of 'quasi contracts' or
contracts implied in law."''
It is interesting to note that all of the statements made were dicta
and that while later courts do cite some of the above cases on other
points, the statement that restitution, unjust enrichment and quasi-
contract are synonymous has not been repeated.8 2
Two additional examples of the misuse of the terms "quasi-con-
tract," "unjust enrichment" and "restitution" are of interest. In
Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co., 8 3 decided in 1951, an
Ohio court said, "[q]uasi-contracts are most often implied in situa-
tions involving unjust enrichment or restitution."'' 84 Does the court
mean that unjust enrichment and restitution are synonomous, or that
they are different and alternative grounds upon which a quasi-
contract can be based? In Frank v. Tavares,8 5 a 1956 California
District Court of Appeal case, the court affirmed plaintiff's re-
covery below on the theory of an oral contract, but said "[the facts
come] well within the doctrine of quasi contract."'8 6 The court
later referred to recovery "upon a theory of quasi-contract or unjust
enrichment . . . . '- Apparently the court considered quasi-con-
tract and unjust enrichment as alternative theories. Since a "theory"
is "[t]he basis of liability or grounds of defense,"' s s and unjust en-
richment is generally accepted as the basis of the quasi-contract ac-
tion,180 unjust enrichment and quasi-contract cannot be alternative
theories.
In a more recent California case, Branche v. Hetzel, 90 it was said
that "[t]he principle of unjust enrichment is related to the subject
of restitution and forms the basis for the right to restitution upon a
377 The case is authority only for the proposition that quasi-contracts rest
on the equitable principle that one shall not be permited to unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.
178 173 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 1965).
179 Id. at 386. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 6 (1963).
180 - Iowa -, 146 N.W.2d 298 (1966).
181 Id. at 305.
182 Lipiniski v. Columbus Plaza, Inc., 225 A.2d 36, 40 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1966)
(citing Hixon v. A-lphin); Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 155 Ohio
St. 391, 396, 99 N.E.2d 301, 304 (1951) (citing Bill v. Gattavara); Binns v. First
Nat'l Bank, 367 Pa. 359, 372, 80 A.2d 768, 776 (1951) (citing Gladowski v.
Felczak); Lauffer v. Vial, 153 Pa. Super. 342, 346, 33 A.2d 777, 779 (1943)
(citing Gladowski v. Felczak).
183 Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 155 Ohio St. 391, 99 N.E.2d
301 (1951).
184 Id. at 396, 99 N.E.2d at 304.
185 Frank v. Tavares, 142 Cal. App. 2d 683, 298 P.2d 887 (1956).
180 Id. at 688, 298 P.2d at 890.
187 Id. at 688-89, 298 P.2d at 890.
188 BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1649 (4th ed. 1951).
180 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1936).
10 241 Cal. App. 2d 801, 51 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1966).
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quasi-contractual theory of recovery."'19 1 Despite a possible misuse
of the word "theory," the statement in Branche v. Hetzei shows an
appreciation of the basic concepts involved.
It is nevertheless apparent from these cases that the meaning
of the terms "quasi-contract," "unjust enrichment" and "restitution"
is unclear and further consideration of these terms by legal writers
and the courts is needed.
Title for the Category
The major problem in terminology is in naming the category of
law dealing with unjust enrichment. First to be considered is the
term "quasi-contract," given general currency as a category of the
American law by Keener in 1896,192 and supported, to some ex-
tent, through the ensuing decades.193  The term "quasi-contract"
was originally taken from Roman law where it named a category of
the law divided into five parts, each having an affinity with some
type of contract. 94  In fact, the word "quasi means like or analo-
gous to,195 so the term "quasi-contract" is intrinsically related to
contract. In the American legal system, the term means an action at
law for the prevention of unjust enrichment. 9 6 Recovery is deter-
mined largely on equitable principles; 197 however, the action is at
law198 and the equitable remedies also based on unjust enrichment
are not generally considered within the scope of quasi-contract. 99
It has also been contended that recovery in quasi-contract may
be based on other grounds than unjust enrichment.2 0 0  For example,
Keener included a statutory, official or customary duty and a record
or judgment as bases of the remedy.201 The Keener position is diffi-
cult to maintain, as mentioned earlier,20 2 and for the purpose of de-
191 Id. at 807, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
192 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 243 (1959).
198 H. LAUBE, CASES ON QUASI-CoNTRACTS (1933); S. STOL.TAR, QUASI-
CONTRACT 1 (1964); P. WINFnELD, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1952); Hand, Restitution
or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARV. L. Rsv. 249 (1898).
194 2 Bouvi s'S LAW DICTIONARY 2781 (3d ed. 1914).
195 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (4th ed. 1951); 74 C.J.S. Quasi at 2
(1951).
190 Frank v. Tavares, 142 Cal. App. 2d 683, 688-89, 298 P.2d 887, 890-91
(1956); W. KEENER, QUAsi-CoNTRACTS 14-16 (1893); F. WOODWARD, QUASI
CONTRACTS 2 (1913).
197 Westgate v. Maryland Cas. Co., 147 F.2d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1945);
Roske v. Ilykanyics, 232 Minn. 383, 389, 45 N.W.2d 769, 774 (1951); Arjay Inv.
Co. v. Kohlmetz, 9 Wis. 2d 535, 538, 101 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1960).
198 Roske v. Ilykanyics, 232 Minn. 383, 389, 45 N.W.2d 769, 774 (1951);
Arjay Inv. Co. v. Kohlmetz, 9 Wis. 2d 535, 538, 101 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1960);
F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 2 (1913); Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q.
REv. 29, 38 (1938).
199 F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 6, at 8 (1913).
200 S. STOLJAR, QUASI-CONTRACT 2-5 (1964), suggests that there is an un-
derlying disagreement between the traditionalists who base quasi-contracts on
an implied contract, and the modernists who base the action on unjust enrich-
ment. See W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 16 (1893); 1 S. WILISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 3(a) (3d ed. 1957).
201 W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 16 (1893).
202 Note 24 supra; see Abbot, Keener on Quasi-Contracts, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 209, 212-15 (1896).
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fining quasi-contract in this comment, unjust enrichment will be con-
sidered the sole basis of the obligation. Professor Williston main-
tains that the law will sometimes impose a duty to restore the plain-
tiff to his former position, rather than merely demand surrender of
the benefit the defendant has received and as such, the basis of the
obligation is not unjust enrichment.203 At first glance, this may
seem to be a valid objection, but a careful analysis reveals that even if
the defendant may sometimes be under a quasi-contractual duty
to restore the plaintiff to his former position and not merely to
surrender any benefit he may have received, the basis of the obliga-
tion remains unjust enrichment. Professor Williston concedes that the
actual amount of recovery is usually the same in both instances,20 4 and
it would seem that in the former case if the defendant had not been
unjustly enriched, the action would not be maintainable. The fact
that the plaintiff may sometimes recover more or less than the
amount by which the defendant was enriched merely indicates that
the courts are applying equitable principles in coming to a just result.
Despite repeated criticism, 205 the term "quasi-contract" seems
well established in both the English and American legal systems,206
and it would be difficult to dislodge it now, even though such a
change would be desirable. The principal criticism of the term is its
connection to contract,207 and although this connection has been occa-
sionally defended,208 it seems clear that it is fallacious and has
203 1 S. WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 3 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1957).
204 Id. § 30.
205 P. WnFIELD, TonTs 8 (1937); Abbot, Keener on Quasi-Contracts, 10
HAIv. L. REV. 209 (1896); Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L.J.
533, 544 (1912); Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 257 (1954).
206 In English law: E.g., Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson
Combe Barbour Ltd., [1943] A.C. 32, 61 (1943); Degiman v. Guaranty Trust
Co., [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785 (Can. 1954); DicEy's CONFLICT OF LAWS 927 (7th ed.
J. Morris ed. 1958); see S. STOLJAR, QUASI-CONTRACT 1 (1964). In American
law: see, e.g., Rosenkoff v. Finkelstein, 195 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Mata-
rese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); Herrmann v.
Gleason, 126 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1942); Cawthon v. Bancokentucky Co., 52
F.2d 850 (W.D. Ky. 1931); Shanks v. Wilson, 86 F. Supp. 789 (S.D. W. Va.
1949); Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Branche v. Het-
zel, 241 Cal. App. 2d 801, 51 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1966); Frank v. Tavares, 142 Cal.
App. 2d 683, 298 P.2d 887 (1956); Indiana Harbor Belt Ry. v. Calumet City,
391 Ill. 280, 63 N.E.2d 369 (1945); Board of Trustees v. Village of Glen Ellyn,
337 ll. App. 183, 85 N.E.2d 473 (1949); Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power &
Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960); Independent School Dist. v.
City of White Bear Lake, 208 Minn. 29, 292 N.W. 777 (1940); Mehl v. Norton,
201 Minn. 203, 275 N.W. 843 (1937); Laughlin v. Boatman's Nat'l Bank, 254
Mo. 467, 189 S.W.2d 974 (1945); West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 138
A.2d 402 (1958); City of Cincinnati v. Fox, 71 Ohio App. 233, 49 N.E.2d 69
(1943); In re Farmers Bank of Amherst, 67 S.D. 51, 289 N.W. 75 (1939); King
County v. Odman, 8 Wash. 2d 32; 111 P.2d 228 (1941); General Accident Fire
& Life Assur. Corp. v. Bergquist, 15 Wis. 2d 166, 111 N.W.2d 900 (1961); Arjay
Inv. Co. v. Kohlmetz, 9 Wis. 2d 535, 101 N.W.2d 700 (1960); Federal Corp. v.
Radtke, 229 Wis. 231, 281 N.W. 921 (1938).
207 3 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 461, at 2312 (1939); Abbot, Keener on Quasi-
Contracts, 10 HARv. L. REV. 209 (1896); Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations,
21 YALE L.J. 533, 544 (1912).
208 R. GoFr & G. JONES, REsTrrro O 3 (1966); Holdsworth, Unjustifiable
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caused considerable confusion in the courts.20 9 A further objection
to the term as a title for the category of law based on unjust enrich-
ment is the fact that quasi-contract has been confined to an action
at law210 and has never included the equitable restitutionary reme-
dies.21 ' For these reasons the term was rejected as a class heading
in the Restatement of Restitution,2 12 and this conclusion seems equally
valid today.
Unjust Enrichment
The term "unjust enrichment" has been suggested to form both
the basis of action within the third category of law213 and the cate-
gory name itself.214 Breaking the term "unjust enrichment" down,
the word "unjust" connotes a moral judgment and, as such, cannot
be precisely defined,215 while the word "enrichment" is a specific fact
and might be defined as the receipt of something of value.216 Unjust
enrichment has been defined as the doctrine that a person shall not
be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's ex-
pense.2
1 7
It is difficult to make very strenuous objections to the term
Enrichment, 55 L.Q. REv. 37 (1939); Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21
YALE L.J. 533, 544 (1912); see R. JACKSON, THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACTS IN
ENGLISH LAW 127 (1936).
209 Note 41 supra.
210 Note 198 supra.
211 Note 199 supra.
212 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 39 (1938).
213 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937); Patterson, The Scope of Res-
titution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. Rnv. 223, 228 (1936); see Frank v.
Tavares, 142 Cal. App. 2d 683, 689, 298 P.2d 890-91 (1956).
214 J. DAwsoN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1951) (suggested by book title);
Friedmann, The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in English Law, 16 CAN. B.
REV. 365, 366 (1938); Jackson, The Restatement of Restitution, 10 Miss. L.J.
95, 96 (1938); Mechem, Book Review, 25 IowA L. REV. 187, 188 (1939); Patter-
son, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. REV. 223, 228
(1936); see Westgate v. Maryland Cas. Co., 147 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1945); Buell
v. Orion State Bank, 327 Mich. 43, 41 N.W.2d 472 (1950); General Accident
Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Bergquist, 15 Wis. 2d 166, 111 N.W.2d 900 (1961);
Arjay Inv. Co. v. Kohlmetz, 9 Wis. 2d 535, 101 N.W.2d 700 (1960).
215 Words have no inherent meaning; that is, they are symbols that signify
an impression arbitrarily assigned to them and have no "natural" meaning.
Williams, The Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REV. 71, 384 (1945). Professor
Powell has argued that nothing is gained by defining words, 9 PROCEEDINGS,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 122 (1934), and it has also been said that precise
definitions of words tend to inhibit growth. See Cairns, Note on Legal Defini-
tions, 36 CoLum. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1936). Nevertheless, the ambiguity of
the English language would seem to require at least general definitions of
words used in the law, and precise definitions would not inhibit growth if the
legal profession were not so reluctant to adopt a new word. In any event,
word definitions are merely short forms of rules or a series of rules, so the
longer the rule, or the more rules for which the word purports to stand, the
less useful the definition. Cairns, supra at 1103. Thus, in the case of a term
like "unjust enrichment" no precise definition will be attempted. See also
2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 481 (1923).
216 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1705 (4th ed. 1951).
217 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1936).
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"unjust enrichment" as a category heading. One objection to the
term as a heading is the fact that some cases involving unjust enrich-
ment go without legal redress.218 Words signifying a title for a cate-
gory of law are defined by a series of rules,219 and if those rules ex-
clude recovery in some circumstances where there has been unjust
enrichment, then "unjust enrichment" should not be used to name the
class. Although an analogous objection and argument could be ap-
plied to the term "contract" as a category of law, since there are
some contracts that are not enforced, this does not refute the argu-
ment as applied to unjust enrichment.
The authors of the Restatement of Restitution do not explain why
they preferred the term "restitution" and Professor Seavey, in fact,
said "[p] erhaps unjust enrichment would be a better term.122 0 It is
felt that any rejection of the term has been because of a general feel-
ing of inappropriateness rather than any logical objection. The term
"unjust enrichment" has not, however, been uniformly rejected as a
category heading. One of the advisors on the Restatement of Restitu-
tion seems to prefer the term, but does not present any arguments for
or against its use.221 Professor Jackson severely criticizes both the
terminology and classification of the Restatement and suggests an al-
ternative category called "unjust enrichment" without presenting any
reasons for his preference.22 2 Professor Friedmann, writing shortly
after the Restatement was published, seems to accept without argu-
ment the term "unjust enrichment" as the heading for the category of
law titled "restitution" by the Restatement.2 2 3 Professor Mechem, in
reviewing a casebook on restitution, said that the Restatement of Res-
titution is really a restatement of a law of unjust enrichment.224
While not specifically discussing terminology, Professor Dawson ap-
parently titles the category of law in question unjust enrichment.2 25
In addition, there are a number of cases that use the term "unjust en-
richment" in such a way as to suggest that it is preferred as the title
of the third category of law.
226
Resiituiion
The third term to consider as a heading for the category of
law based on unjust enrichment is "restitution." In its specific
218 S. STOLJAR, QUASI-CONTRACT 1 (1964); see Takeuchi v. Schmuck, 206
Cal. 782, 276 P. 345 (1929); Haas v. Greenwald, 196 Cal. 236, 237 P. 33 (1925);
Bierman v. Hagstrom Constr. Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d 771, 1 Cal. Rptr. 826
(1959).
219 Note 215 supra.
220 Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 257 (1954).
221 See Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo.
L. REV. 223 (1936).
222 Jackson, The Restatement of Restitution, 10 Miss. L.J. 95, 96 (1938).
223 Friedmann, The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in English Law, 16
CAN. B. REv. 365, 366 (1938).
224 Mechem, Book Review, 25 IOWA L. REV. 187, 188 (1939).
225 J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1951).
226 Westgate v. Maryland Cas. Co., 147 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1945); State v.
Martin, 59 Ariz. 438, 130 P.2d 48 (1942); Lipinski v. Columbus Plaza, Inc., 225
A.2d 36 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1966); Powell v. Sheets, 196 Ore. 682, 251 P.2d 108
(1952); General Casmir Pulaski Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Provident Trust Co.,
338 Pa. 198, 12 A.2d 336 (1940).
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sense, the word means the return of something to its rightful
owner.22 7 It also has a broad meaning covering an entire category
of the law based on unjust enrichment.228 This category is based on
the premise that a person has the right to be protected against the
unjust enrichment of another at his expense.229 Thus whatever word
is used as the category title must be similarly defined, so that restitu-
tion when used in this sense is the right to legal redress when another
has been unjustly enriched at one's expense. The term has been used,
however, in a number of ways. Originally restitution was a writ
available to recover property paid over on a judgment, when the judg-
ment was subsequently reversed.230  Today the term is loosely used
as in "action," 231 "suit,' 232 "claim, '233 "doctrine, 234 "theory,"23 5 "prin-
ciple,"2316 and "remedy."23 7
227 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (4th ed. 1951); 46 Am. Jun. Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment at 99 (1943); see Holloway v. People's Water Co., 100
Kan. 414, 167 P. 265 (1917).
228 RESTATEMENT o RESTITUTION (1936) (as suggested by the title);
Seavy & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 29-31 (1938).
229 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1936).
230 See Holloway v. People's Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 167 P. 265 (1917);
Haebler v. Myers, 132 N.Y. 363, 30 N.E. 963 (1892); Lytle v. Payette-Oregon
Slope Irr. Dist., 175 Ore. 276, 152 P.2d 934 (1944); 46 Am. JuR. Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment at 99 (1943).
231 See Slater v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 307 N.Y. 419, 121 N.E.2d 398 (1954);
National Maritime Union v. Taystee Bar-B-Q Corp., 192 Pa. Super. 362, 161
A.2d 646 (1960); Home Say. Bank v. General Fin. Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 417, 103
N.W.2d 117 (1960).
232 See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935); Green-
wood County v. Duke Power Co., 107 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1939); 5 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 4038 at 1444A (Rev. ed. S. Williston & G. Thompson 1936).
233 See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935); Harriman
v. Tetik, 56 Cal. 2d 805, 17 Cal. Rptr. 134, 366 P.2d 486 (1961).
234 See Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 25 F. Supp. 419 (W.D.S.C.
1938); Milman v. Denniston, 271 App. Div. 988, 68 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1947); Estate
of Buereton, 388 Pa. 206, 130 A.2d 453 (1957); National Maritime Union v.
Taystee Bar-B-Q Corp., 192 Pa. Super. 362, 161 A.2d 646 (1960).
235 See Barnes v. Eastern & W. Lumber Co., 205 Ore. 553, 287 P.2d 929
(1955); Lauffer v. Vial, 153 Pa. Super. 342, 33 A.2d 777 (1943); Home Say.
Bank v. General Fin. Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 417, 103 N.W.2d 117 (1960); Duffy v.
Scott, 235 Wis. 142, 292 N.W. 273 (1940).
236 Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d 8 (1955); Binns v. First
Nat'l Bank, 367 Pa. 359, 80 A.2d 768 (1951); 46 Am. JuR. Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment at 100 (1943); 77 C.J.S. Restitution at 322 (1952).
237 United States v. Parkinson, 135 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Cal. 1955); General
Contract Purchase Corp. v. Clem, 220 Ark. 863, 251 S.W.2d 112 (1952); Freed-
man v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230
P.2d 629 (1951); Crofoot Lumber, Inc. v. Thompson, 163 Cal. App. 2d 324, 329
P.2d 302 (1958); Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d 8 (1955); Haebler
v. Myers, 132 N.Y. 363, 30 N.E. 963 (1892); Lytle v. Payette-Oregon Slope Irr.
Dist., 175 Ore. 276, 152 P.2d 934 (1944); Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d
335 (1947); Home Say. Bank v. General Fin. Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 417, 103 N.W.2d
117 (1960); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS 460 (1951); 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
4038 at § 1444A (Rev. ed. S. Williston & G. Thompson 1936); BALENTINE LAw
DICTIONARY 1133 (2d ed. 1948).
1192 [Vol. 19
CONCEPT AND TERMS
When used in connection with doctrine,23 8 theory23 9 or princi-
ple,2 40 restitution refers to the title of the category of law based on
unjust enrichment, and as such, stands for the right of a person not
to have another unjustly enriched at his expense. On the other
hand, restitution, when used in connection with an action,2 41 suit2 42 or
claim2 43 may mean either that the plaintiff has a right, restitution,
which he is enforcing, or that the plaintiff demands restitution in its
specific sense as the means of enforcing his right. In the first of
these alternatives, restitution is used as a title and stands for a
right, while in the second alternative, restitution is used as a rem-
edy.
The root of the problem lies in the usage of the term "remedy."
As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, a remedy is "[t] he means by
which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, re-
dressed, or compensated."244 It has also been said, however, that
"[a] remedy is an obligation destined to stand in the place of the
plaintiff's rights, and be, as nearly as possible, an equivalent to him
for his rights. ' 24 5 If remedy is defined as the means by which a
right is enforced, use of the word "restitution" as a remedy results
in the nonsensical proposition that "restitution" is enforced by "res-
titution," and it seems clear that one meaning must logically give
way to the other.
If, on the other hand, a remedy stands in place of a right and is
equal to that right, it is not inconsistent to use restitution as both a
remedy and a right. It would appear that the two meanings of the
word "remedy" are inconsistent. In the first meaning, remedy regu-
lates only how much will be recovered, the most common example
being damages. In the second meaning, remedy involves the deter-
innation both as to when recovery will be allowed and how much
will be allowed, an example being conversion.
In conversion the plaintiff must prove such factors as the extent
and duration of the defendant's control of the chattel, his intent to
assert a right which is inconsistent with the plaintiff's right of con-
trol, good or bad intent, harm done to the chattel, and expense or
inconvenience to the plaintiff.2 46 Once some or all of these factors
238 A "doctrine" is "[a] rule, principle, theory, or tenet of the law."
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 568 (4th ed. 1951).
239 A "theory" is "[t]he basis of liability or grounds of defense." Id. at
1649.
240 A "principle" is "[a] fundamental truth or doctrine, as of law; a com-
prehensive rule or doctrine which furnishes a basis or origin of others." Id.
at 1357.
241 An "action" is "It]he legal and formal demand of one's right from
another person or party made and insisted on in a court of justice." Id. at 49.
242 A "suit" is a "[p]roceeding by one person or persons against another
or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues, in such court,
the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity." Id. at 1603.
243 A "claim" is "[t]o demand as one's own; to assert." Id. at 313.
244 Id. at 1457.
245 Hand, Restitution or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARV. L. Rsv. 249, 256
(1898).
246 W. PRossEm, TORTS § 15, at 81 (1964).
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are established, the right to recovery under conversion exists, and the
plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of the chattel.247  Other than
the factual question of what is the actual value of the chattel, the
extent of recovery is established at the same time the right of re-
covery is established. Thus conversion should not be called a remedy
if damages is also called a remedy.
It is submitted that the word "remedy" should be confined to the
first meaning, that is, a set of rules regulating the amount or kind of
recovery, and that the so-called "remedies" of conversion, quasi-
contract, or any others that involve rules of when the plaintiff can
recover should be considered "actions" or some other appropriate
term. For the purpose of this comment, the word "action" has been
used for those terms describing the rules regulating when (under
what conditions) recovery will be allowed as well as for those that
regulate both when and how much recovery will be allowed. Con-
tract, then, is an action, as is conversion, while damages is a remedy.
In the Restatement of Restitution the word "restitution" is used
both as a remedy and as a title for the third category of law. It is
said, "[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of
another is required to make restitution to the other. '248 Restitution,
when used in this way, indicates that the term stands for the measure
of recovery, i.e. a remedy. The Restatement goes on, however, to
list six remedies which a person may use when he is entitled to resti-
tution,24 9 thus implying that restitution is not a remedy, or is a
"remedy" in the second sense of the word.
Technically, if "restitution" were used as a remedy, its presently
accepted meaning, the regaining of something one once had,25 0 would
limit any recovery to loss alone. Thus anything other than that
which the plaintiff once had might be excluded from the measure
of recovery by the intrinsic meaning of the word. However, re-
covery based on unjust enrichment depends on either loss or bene-
fit.251 Given that recovery is not necessarily limited to loss alone,25 2
it is incorrect to use the term restitution as a remedy.
The objection does not apply, however, when the word is used as
an action because the intrinsic limitation of loss refers only to the
247 Id. § 15, at 81-98.
248 RESTATEMENT OF RESTiTUTioN § 1 (1937).
249 Id. at § 4 (self help, judgment by court of law enforced by sheriff to
seize and restore, decree by court of equity that title or possession be trans-
ferred, decree by court of equity of a lien, subrogation, judgment at law or
decree in equity for payment of money).
250 Fineg v. Pickrell, 81 Ariz. 313, 320, 305 P.2d 455, 459 (1956); Holloway
v. People's Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 423-24, 167 P. 265, 270 (1917) (states com-
mon law meaning in dictum); 46 Amr. JuR. Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment at 99 (1943); BALLENTNEs LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (1930). Contra, Basile
v. United States, 38 A.2d 620, 622 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1944); Fineg v. Pickrell,
supra, at 324, 305 P.2d at 462 (dissent); Holloway v. People's Water Co., supra.
(holding); State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 231, 3 A.2d 521, 525 (1939).
251 W. PROSsER, TORTS 644 (3d ed. 1964); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3
(3rd ed. W. Jaeger 1957); 46 Am. JuR. Restitution and Unjust Enrichment at
99 (1943); Fraser, Introduction to Symposium on the Oklahoma Law of Res-
titution, 9 OKLA. L. REV. 301 (1956); Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv.
29, 37 (1938).
252 Note 254 infra.
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right to recover (when recovery will be allowed) and it is a require-
ment of recovery based on unjust enrichment that the plaintiff have
lost something.253 Having lost something however, he may recover,
in some instances, more than he lost if the defendant was unjustly
enriched by more than the loss.
254
In the case of restitution, then, a choice must be made between
using the term as a "remedy" or as an "action."25 5 The action, being
a set of rules determining when the plaintiff can recover, may be
rather specific and narrow as in conversion, or may be broad enough
to include one of the three primary categories of the law.250  It is
submitted that the term "restitution" should be in the latter class,
and that when the right of restitution has been established, a new
word, such as "reparation '257 or "expiation,"258 should be used as
the remedy for the action of restitution.
The position taken in this comment that "restitution" should be
used as the heading for the third category of the law has considerable
support,25 9 but is also faced with some opposition.260 It must be ad-
253 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, comment a at 12 (1937).
254 Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946); W.
PROSSE, TORTS 644 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, comment
e at 14-15 (1936); Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 37 (1938); see
Basile v. United States, 38 A.2d 620, 622 (1944).
255 Compare Professor Dawson's use of the term "restitution" in the title
of his case book, E. DURFEE & J. DAwsoN, CASES ON REMEDIES II RESTITUTION
AT LAW AND EQUITY (1939), with his later statement that the "law of restitu-
tion cuts across all remedies." J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRCHMENT 39 (1951).
2150 No attempt has been made to formalize the procedure beyond a dis-
tinction between "action" and "remedy," as any such attempt is not within
the scope of this comment. It might be noted, however, that attention to the
words "in" and "for" might help provide a clearer understanding of the sub-
ject. That is, one would say that the action is brought "in restitution" or "in
contract" or "in tort," meaning the broad area of the law under which the
plaintiff seeks recovery. One would then say the action is "for the remedy"
of "damages," "constructive trust" or "specific performance."
257 Reparation is the "[a]ct or process of repairing or restoring" or the
"[a] ct of making amends or giving satisfaction or compensation for a wrong,
injury, etc." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2111 (2d ed. 1951).
It has also been defined as "[t]he redress of an injury; amends for a wrong
inflicted." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1462 (4th ed. 1951). Professor Patterson
used the word to replace "restitution" as the remedy for unjust enrichment.
Patterson, Improvements in the Law of Restitution, 40 CORNELL L.Q. REV. 667,
671 (1955). It has also been said that "reparation" is synonymous with "res-
titution." 77 C.J.S. Restitution at 322 (1952).
258 Expiation is the "[a]ct of making satisfaction or atonement for a
crime or fault; . .. the means by which reparation or atonement is made;
.... " WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 897 (2d ed. 1951).
259 Branche v. Hetzel, 241 Cal. App. 2d 801, 51 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1966);
Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843
(1960); DicEY's CONFLICT OF LAws 927 (7th ed. J. Morris ed. 1958); 5 R.
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 242 (1959); R. GOFF & G. JONES, RESTITUTION (1966);
Fraser, Introduction to Symposium on the Oklahoma Law of Restitution, 9
OILA. L. REV. 301 (1956); Macaulay, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
1133, 1138 (1959); Maudsley, Restitution in England, 19 VMD. L. REV. 1123
(1965); Patterson, Improvements in the Law of Restitution, 40 CoRMLL L.Q.
667 (1955); Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo.
L. REV. 223 (1936); Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 257
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mitted that those writers and courts that have accepted "restitution"
as the heading of the third category of the law have done so without,
for the most part, comment or argument one way or the other. Dean
Pound said "[h] ence the American Law Institute took a step forward
in treating the obligation arising from unjust enrichment separately
under the appropriate name of Restitution."261 Lord Wright in a book
review of the Restatement of Restitution said "[t]he general title
Restitution is well chosen but may need explanation. ' 262  The Re-
statement itself, made no attempt to justify the use of the term resti-
tution as the general title, and the question received only cursory
treatment in Professors Seavey and Scott's subsequent article which
explained and defended the Restatement.263  Professor Patterson
briefly considered the terminology of the subject, but while criticizing
all three terms (quasi-contract, unjust enrichment and restitution),
he concluded that "[t]here is much to be said for limiting the title to
'Restitution,' a term which has some recognition in judicial opin-
ions. 2 6
4
Perhaps the strongest objection to the Restatement terminology
was made by Professor Jackson,2 65 who objected to the classifica-
tion of the law into tort, contract and restitution because tort and
contract are based on the source of the obligation while he said
restitution is based on the remedy. 266 He also argued that the
term "restitution" should not include cases of constructive trust, and
that the suggested name, restitution, is so vague as to be useless. 26 7
In the same vein, Professor Logan, in a book review of the Restatement
of Restitution, discussed and generally agreed with Jackson's criti-
cism of the Restatement's classification and terminology.268 Logan,
however, disagreeing with Jackson, argued that the term "restitution"
is properly applied to the second section of the Restatement which
deals with constructive trusts. 269 The basis of this argument is that
(1954); Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29 (1938); Thurston, Recent
Developments in Restitution: 1940-1947, 45 MICH. L. REV. 935 (1947); Waters,
The English Constructive Trust: A Look into the Future, 19 VAND. L. REV.
1215 (1966); Dawson, Book Review, 38 COmLL L.Q. 634, 635 (1953); Wright,
Book Review, 51 HAnv. L. Rzv. 369 (1937). It might also be noted that the
American Law Institute accepted the premise and name of the Restatement
of Restitution without comment. 13 AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE PROCEDINGS
222 (1936).
260 Jackson, The Restatement of Restitution, 10 MIss. L.J. 95, 96 (1938);
Logan, Book Review, 2 MODERN L. REV. 153, 154 (1938); see J. DAwsoN, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT (1951); S. STOL.AR, QUASI-CONTRACT 1 (1964); Patterson, The
Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. REV. 223 (1936); Mech-
em, Book Review, 25 IowA L. REV. 187, 188 (1939).
261 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 243-44 (1959).
262 51 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1937).
263 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29 (1938).
264 Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L.
REV. 223, 230 (1936). Professor Patterson also wrote a later article in which
he seemed to accept the Restatement's terminology. Patterson, Improvements
in the Law of Restitution, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 667 (1955).
265 Jackson, The Restatement of Restitution, 10 Miss. L.J. 95 (1938).
266 Id.
267 Id. at 96.
268 Logan, Book Review, 2 MODERN L. REV. 153 (1938).
269 Id. at 154. Jackson argued that the term "restitution" is inappropriate
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the Restatement's definition of restitution makes it a property right
or an action in rem.270 The validity of this argument is dependent on
restitution being considered a remedy. That is, if restitution is a
remedy, recovery is limited to what the plaintiff lost, i.e. specific
property. As pointed out above, however, restitution should not be
considered a remedy, in which case there would be no such limitation
and the action could be in personam.271 Logan further argued that
the term "restitution" is inappropriate to head the category because
ejectment and detinue are restitutionary, but are not included in
the category by the Restatement of Restitution.2 7 2 It is thought this
argument carries little weight. First, the fact that these actions were
not treated by the Restatement does not necessarily exclude them
from the category; second, even if they are excluded, this does not
present an argument against the term "restitution" since logic does
not form the only basis of a classification.2 73  Jackson and Logan's
main objection to the use of restitution is based on the term's connota-
tion of a remedy rather than a source of the obligation. 27 4  This
objection has some logical merit if restitution is considered a remedy.
Even if restitution is not considered a remedy, the argument cannot
be dismissed because contract and tort do connote the basis of the
obligation, while restitution apparently does not. A closer look, how-
ever, reduces the force of this argument considerably. The word
"tort" is derived from the Latin tortus meaning twisted.2 7 5 In the
English language it has come to mean wrong2 76 and, as such, con-
notes the basis of the category of law it now titles. Restitution
is derived from the Latin restitutio meaning restoring27 7 and has
come to mean "a restoration of anything to its rightful owner."278s
It is further submitted that "restitution" has already gained consider-
able acceptance in its "restore when just" definition,27 9 and it only
remains for time to complete the transformation.
In summary, the term "restitution" has been used in two contra-
dictory senses, right and remedy. However, at the present stage in
the development of the category of law called "Restitution," it is no
easy task to eliminate either usage of the word. Because restitution is
not a remedy in the true sense of the word, and because it has con-
siderable support as the title of a category of law, it is suggested
that the former usage, i.e. a right, is the more desirable. In any
event the important point is the need for consideration by, and agree-
for either section of the Restatement. Jackson, The Restatement of Restitution,
10 Mss. L.J. 95, 103 (1938).
270 Logan, Book Review, 2 MODERN L. REV. 153, 154 (1938).
271 The action at law is in personam. Independent School Dist. v. City of
White Bear Lake, 208 Minn. 29, 292 N.W. 777 (1940). However, the construc-
tive trust remedy is in rem. Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 42
(1938).
272 Logan, Book Review, 2 MODERN L. REv. 153, 154 (1938).
273 Note 66 supra.
274 Jackson, The Restatement of Restitution, 10 Miss. L.J. 95 (1938);
Logan, Book Review, 2 MODERN L. REV. 153, 154 (1938).
275 W. PROssER, TORTS 2 (3d ed. 1964).
276 Id.
277 WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTioNARY 2125 (2d ed. 1951).
278 Id. (emphasis added).
279 46 Aam. JuR. Restitution and Unjust Enrichment at 99 (1943).
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ment among, the legal writers, the courts and the practicing lawyers
regarding a more precise definition and application of the terminology
of restitution.
Peter W. Davis*
* Member, Second Year Class.
